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The Relation Between Policies concerning Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) and Philosophical Moral 
Theories – An Empirical Investigation 
 
Claus S. Frederiksen 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the relation between policies concerning Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and philosophical moral theories. The objective is to determine which 
moral theories form the basis for CSR policies. Are they based on ethical egoism, 
libertarianism, utilitarianism or some kind of common-sense morality? To address this issue, 
I conducted an empirical investigation examining the relation between moral theories and 
CSR policies, in companies engaged in CSR. Based on the empirical data I collected, I start by 
suggesting some normative arguments used by the respondents. Secondly, I suggest that 
these moral arguments implicitly rely on some specific moral principles, which I 
characterise. Thirdly, on the basis of these moral principles, I suggest the moral theories 
upon which the CSR policies are built. Previous empirical studies examining the relation 
between philosophical moral theories and the ethical content of business activities have 
mainly concentrated on the ethical decision-making of managers. Some of the most 
prominent investigations in that regard propose that managers mainly act in accordance 
with utilitarian moral theory (Fritzsche and Becker, 1984; Premeaux and Mony, 1993; 
Premeaux, 2004). I conclude that CSR policies are not based on utilitarian thinking, but 
instead on some kind of common-sense morality. The ethical foundation of companies 
engaged in CSR thus does not mirror the ethical foundation of managers.  
 
Introduction 
For companies engaged in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), one important question to 
be asked is which moral theories form the basis of their CSR policies? Are they based on self-
interest, utilitarian thinking, some kind of common-sense morality, or are they based on 
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libertarian thinking regarding negative duties to do no harm? Answering this question is 
important for two reasons. First of all, we need knowledge about the moral foundation of 
CSR if we want to discuss whether that moral foundation seems reasonable. Secondly, it will 
be interesting to determine whether the moral foundations of companies‟ official ethical 
business guidelines, in which CSR policies play a major role, mirror the moral foundations 
of managers.  
This is a new category of investigation, with a focus different from previous studies on CSR. 
As Margolis and Walsh argue, empirical investigations concerning CSR have mainly focused 
on instrumental considerations, i.e., the relation between CSR and financial performance; the 
normative aspect of CSR has been somewhat neglected (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). 
However, investigations have been conducted regarding the ethical foundations of 
managers, which appears to be a related area, since managers are expected to abide by 
official company policies.  In that regard, some of the prominent empirical investigations 
conclude that managers, when faced with an ethical dilemma, primarily make decisions 
based on a utilitarian moral theory rather than on moral theories of justice or rights (Fritzche 
and Becker, 1984; Premeaux and Mony, 1993; Premeaux, 2004). Other studies concerning the 
ethical content of business activities reach the almost opposite conclusion that individuals 
rely more on theories of fairness and justice rather than on goal-orientated utilitarian 
thinking (Reidenbach and Robin, 1990).  
The current study is part of an empirical investigation focusing on the CSR policies of three 
international Danish companies all engaged in CSR. The objectives were to examine the 
moral theories upon which their CSR policies are based, and the reasons why these 
companies support one kind of policy rather than another. The focus of this paper will be on 
the component of the study concerned with positive duties, i.e., positive CSR agency by 
companies. I thus will not be addressing the component of my investigation regarding 
negative duties, i.e., refraining from doing harm, but rather only the component of the study 
concerning actively doing good. From the data analyses, it became clear to me that one is 
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best able to examine moral theories on the basis of empirical data in relation to positive 
duties.  
This paper consists of five main components. First, we start with a description of the moral 
framework and the hypotheses. Next, is a section describing the research design. Following 
this, I report the findings, i.e., the normative arguments, regarding positive duties, 
companies present in relation to their CSR policies. Next, I discuss the findings and describe 
the moral principles upon which the companies‟ CSR policies are based. Finally, I discuss 
whether it is possible to confirm any of my hypotheses. 
 
Moral framework 
The literature is filled with studies on different types of moral frameworks. For example, 
Cavanagh, Moberg and Velasquez describe a moral framework that includes three basic 
moral theories: utilitarian theories, theories of right and theories of justice (Cavanagh et at., 
1981). This framework is used by Fritzche and Becker, Premeaux and Mony, and Premeaux 
(Fritzche and Becker, 1984; Premeaux and Mony, 1993; Premeaux, 2004). Reidenbach and 
Robin use another moral framework, containing five different basic moral orientations: 
deontology, utilitarianism, relativism, egoism and justice theories (Reidenbach and Robin, 
1988). Yet, Crane and Matten, when describing traditional moral theories, highlight four 
different moral theories: egoism, utilitarianism, ethics of duties, and theories of rights and 
justice (Crane and Matten, 2007).   
The theories used in the current study are slightly different from those mentioned above. 
However, the basic moral framework is the same, since I also distinguish between 
teleological goal-orientated theories and duty-based deontological theories. I have chosen to 
distinguish between two kinds of teleological moral theories, i.e., egoism and utilitarianism, 
and two kinds of deontological moral theories, i.e., libertarianism and common-sense 
morality. It is important when studying CSR policies not simply to determine whether 
companies base their policy on a teleological or a deontological theory, but also to determine 
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whether the theory is a minimalistic moral theory, i.e., egoism and libertarianism, or a more 
demanding moral theory, i.e., utilitarianism and common-sense morality. As will be clear in 
the following, the difference between supporting a minimalistic theory, like ethical egoism, 
and supporting a more demanding theory, like utilitarianism, is of great importance, even 
though they are both teleological theories, since these differences have a major impact on the 
design of the companies‟ CSR policies.  As such, the moral framework I have chosen to use 
contains four moral theories: egoism, libertarianism, utilitarianism and common-sense 
morality. In the following, I present these four theories.  
 
Egoism 
Moral egoists believe that the morally correct action is the one that maximises the good for 
the moral agent, i.e., a company ought to act in its own self-interest (Reidenbach and Robin, 
1988; Crane and Matten, 2007). Thus, a company ought to do good or refrain from doing 
harm only if it is good for the company, normally meaning if it helps to maximise profit. 
CSR thus is not concerned with a moral obligation to benefit others; it is only concerned with 
benefiting the company, which means that the company must worry about its employees, 
the local community or needy strangers, like poor Africans, only if it is in the company‟s 
self-interest.  
 
Libertarianism 
Libertarians believe in the existence of negative rights like freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, freedom from coercion etc., but not in positive duties, like donating to charity. It 
might be a good thing to help poor Africans, but you have no moral obligation to do so. 
Thus, people have a moral obligation not to do harm, but they have no moral obligation to 
positively help anyone (Nozick, 1974). In relation to CSR, libertarians believe that companies 
have no moral obligation to positively help anyone; they are only morally obligated not to 
violate anyone‟s negative rights. 
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Utilitarianism 
Utilitarians believe that moral agents always have to promote the best possible outcome seen 
from an impartial perspective. For utilitarians, the best possible outcome maximises the total 
sum of happiness (Singer, 1972; Smart, 1973). In relation to CSR, utilitarians believe that 
companies have a moral obligation to promote the best possible outcome, i.e., maximise 
happiness from an impartial perspective. In this regard, impartiality means that one is 
impartial in relation to who the benefactor is and who the beneficiary is. Thus, companies 
are equally obligated to promote the happiness of total strangers, for example poor Africans, 
and those closely related to the company, for example the employees. Even though it is an 
empirical question, i.e., which action is likely to maximise happiness, the utilitarian position 
appears, however, very demanding, suggesting that companies use a great deal of their 
resources to help the poor, sick and hungry masses around the world. Utilitarians have 
generally argued that helping the poor and hungry people, for example, in Africa, rather 
than relatively well-off people, for example, in Denmark, seems to maximise happiness as 
seen from an impartial point of view, other things being equal (Singer, 1970). 
 
Common-sense morality 
Supporters of common-sense morality believe in the existence of both negative rights and 
positive duties. In relation to CSR, supporters of the common-sense orientation believe that 
companies have a moral obligation not to violate anyone‟s rights and that they also have 
positive duties towards certain groups, such as employees, the local community and others 
closely related to the company. This orientation, which is identical to the position Kagan 
refers to as ordinary morality, is in accordance with our immediate moral intuitions, i.e., we 
ought to follow moral principles that are in accordance with our immediate moral intuitions 
(Kagan, 1989). The relevant common-sense moral principles presented in this article seem to 
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be principles concerning special obligations; for example, special obligations towards 
shareholders or other closely related groups. 
 
On the basis of this moral framework, I suggest the following four hypotheses: 
 
H1: The CSR policies of companies engaged in CSR concerning positive duties are not 
based on ethical egoism. On the contrary, these companies believe that decisions should 
not be based solely on a business rationale, i.e., companies do not support Friedman‟s 
old mantra that the social responsibility of business is solely to maximise profits 
(Friedman, 1970). 
 
H2: The CSR policies of companies engaged in CSR concerning positive duties are not 
based on libertarian thinking like the one outlined by Nozick, where agents only have 
negative duties and no positive duties (Nozick, 1974). 
 
H3: The CSR policies of companies engaged in CSR concerning positive duties are not 
based on utilitarian moral thinking; these companies do not follow utilitarians like 
Singer and Smart, i.e., feeling obligated to choose the action that will maximise 
happiness seen from an impartial point of view (Singer, 1972; Smart, 1973). 
 
H4: The CSR policies of companies engaged in CSR concerning positive duties are based 
on some kind of common-sense morality, such as the one discussed by Kagan, 
containing immediate, intuitive, plausible moral principles concerning special 
obligations towards certain individuals or groups of individuals (Kagan, 1989). 
 
Method 
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In the following, I start with a description of the context of my research, i.e., a description of 
the three participating companies and the relation of my study to other studies in the area. 
Second, I describe the design of the data collection. Third, I describe my method for 
analysing the collected data.      
 
The research context  
The participating companies in this study were chosen firstly because they have all been 
engaged in CSR activities for a long time and are all perceived as national CSR frontrunners. 
Secondly, apart from their CSR engagement, they are very different, and therefore represent 
more than one kind of industry. Coloplast develops and manufactures medical devices and 
services, operates globally, has about 7,000 employees, has a revenue of about USD 1.4 
billion and is a listed company. Danfoss, on the other hand, develops and manufactures 
mechanical and electronic products and controls, operates globally, has about 22,000 
employees, has a revenue of about USD 3.9 billion, and is a family-owned corporation. 
TrygVesta is an insurance company that operates in Scandinavia; it has about 4,000 
employees, has a revenue of about USD 3.0 billion, and is a listed company. Moreover, I am 
aware that there might be differences between the companies that I have investigated and 
other companies that engage in CSR.  
It is also important to note that the context of my investigation is different from the studies 
on ethical decision making referred to earlier. First of all, the current study is about 
companies‟ CSR policies and not about the morality of marketing students (Reidenbach and 
Robin, 1990) or marketing managers (Fritzche and Becker, 1984; Premeaux and Mony, 1993; 
Premeaux, 2004). Secondly, the current study takes place in a European context and not in an 
American context (Reidenbach and Robin, 1990; Fritzche and Becker, 1984; Premeaux and 
Mony, 1993; Premeaux, 2004). Thirdly, the current study concerns companies that engage in 
CSR and not companies in general. In relation to earlier studies regarding ethical decision 
making, results presented here thus only can be used to examine European companies 
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engaged in CSR, to determine if they exhibit the same kind of moral theories as American 
managers or marketing students. This means that even if the moral theories differ between 
companies engaged in CSR and managers, this still might be due to either a difference 
between the European and American context or between managers working for companies 
engaged in CSR and managers in general.       
 
Data collection design 
Early in the process I realised that to determine which moral theories CSR policies are based 
on, it is not enough just to analyse the CSR attitudes communicated in annual reports, 
internal codes of conduct, or on websites etc. These CSR attitudes are often so vaguely 
presented that it is impossible to determine their underlying moral principles. Even though 
companies in some respects indicate who they feel morally obligated toward, for example 
the local community, they often do not present the underlying normative reasons regarding 
why they believe they have such an obligation or why they do not feel obligated toward 
groups that are not mentioned. This information, however, is important if one wants to 
determine the moral principles and theories upon which CSR policies are based.    
To explore the topic, I conducted 21 partly structured and partly semi-structured qualitative 
interviews with key CSR personnel, seven from each company. Key CSR personnel are those 
people responsible for developing and implementing the CSR policies of the companies, for 
example CSR managers, brand executives and CEOs, and people responsible for 
implementing the companies‟ CSR policies, for example, HR managers, sales executives and 
production managers. In the semi-structured part of the interviews, I used an open-ended 
interview guide, inviting the respondents to focus on different themes, thus giving me the 
opportunity to pursue some of these themes (Kvale, 2008). The more structured part of the 
interview guide consisted of classical ethical dilemmas with a CSR twist and a moral case 
concerning stakeholders. All of the interviews were done in Danish, meaning that the 
following quotations from the interviews and extracts from the interview guide are 
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translated versions of the original transcribed interviews. Since the objective was to get a 
picture of the CSR policies of the companies, to make it possible to suggest which moral 
principles the CSR policies are based on, the interview guide entailed a wide range of 
questions and ethical cases, addressing the attitudes of the companies toward avoiding 
harm, for example, regarding discrimination and worker safety, and their obligations to 
actively do good, for example, providing clean water to the local community.  
In that regard, I am fully aware there may be differences between the companies‟ actual CSR 
policies and the answers given by the respondents, for example, when they were presented 
with moral dilemmas. The respondents were invited to choose the action they believed to be 
in accordance with the CSR policies of their companies. This might of course conflict with 
the action chosen by the company, if actually put in that situation. However, all of the 
respondents had the opportunity to prepare for the main questions and all the moral cases, 
before the interviews, and they also had the opportunity to comment afterwards on the 
transcribed interviews. This seems to minimise the risk of ill-considered, spontaneously 
personal answers that are not in accordance with the official CSR policy. Further, the 
questions and the moral cases were also directed at each respondent depending on which of 
the companies he or she was working for and the position of the respondent in that 
company. For example, a sales executive would be presented moral cases regarding the 
company‟s attitude towards racist customers, and a production executive would be asked 
about worker safety.  
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the focus of this article is on the positive duties of the 
companies, i.e., the obligation to actively help people and prioritise between groups. The key 
CSR personnel, in that regard, were presented with two kinds of moral cases and some 
moral questions. The first moral case focused on a dilemma in which the company could 
help a small but closely related group or a larger but non-related group. In the second case, 
the respondents were presented with ten potential stakeholders, and asked to determine 
which of them their company had an obligation toward and in what order. Regarding the 
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first moral case, I presented the relevant respondents (relevant refers to those respondents 
with competencies to answer the specific questions concerning the companies‟ CSR policy) 
at Coloplast and Danfoss with the following dilemma: 
 
Moral case 1A: Clean Water 
Coloplast/Danfoss is planning to build a well supplying clean water to 500 people in a town 
housing one of your factories. However, your company realises that for the same amount of 
money it would be able to build two wells in a far away town, supplying clean water to 
1,000 people. What would your company decide to do? 
 
Since TrygVesta operates only in Scandinavia, the Clean Water dilemma is not relevant for 
the company. Instead, the relevant respondents at TrygVesta were presented the following 
morally similar dilemma concerning homework assistance for immigrant children. 
 
Moral case 1B: Homework 
TrygVesta is planning to make a donation to an immigration project in the local community. 
The donation will pay for homework assistance to 50 immigrant children. However, 
TrygVesta realises that for the same amount of money assistance can be provided to 100 
immigrant children in another EU country, where TrygVesta does not operate. What would 
your company decide to do? 
 
When respondents addressing the above-mentioned dilemmas decided the company would 
help locally, then I raised the stakes, i.e., increased the number of people being helped in the 
remote area from twice as many to ten times as many as locally and I even sometimes 
changed the possible donation from wells or homework assistance to malaria medicine for 
needy Africans. The point was to find out if the number counted at all, and whether the 
respondent changed his/her line of argument when the stakes got higher. 
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In the Stakeholder case, I presented the following case to all of the respondents at Coloplast: 
 
Moral case 2: Stakeholder 
To which of the following groups does Coloplast have an obligation, and in what order: 1) 
The owners of the company; 2) Needy children in Africa; 3) Suppliers; 4) The local nursing 
home; 5) Its Employees; 6) Convatec (competitor); 7) Its Customers; 8) Fredensborg 
Kommune (the local municipality); 9) Save the Children (charity organisation); and 10) FC 
Nordsjælland (the local football club). 
 
I presented all of the respondents at Danfoss and TrygVesta with morally similar cases 
including their competitors, local municipalities and so on. Besides these moral cases, the 
interview guide also contained some direct questions concerning positive duties. I thus 
asked one respondent from Coloplast, one from Danfoss and two from TrygVesta the 
following questions: 
 
Direct question 1 and 2 
1. Do you believe that your company‟s social obligations are stronger in its local area than in 
distant places? 
2. How does your company demarcate its social commitment, i.e., how does it demarcate 
who and how it wants to help? 
 
The purpose of presenting these moral cases and asking the direct questions was to be able 
to confirm or reject the hypotheses (H1, H2, H3 and H4); i.e., to find out whether the CSR 
policies of companies engaged in CSR, regarding positive duties, are based on ethical 
egoism, libertarianism, utilitarianism or common-sense morality. The main purpose of the 
Clean Water/Homework dilemma was thus to determine if companies that engage in CSR 
prefer to help the largest number of people, or whether they feel some kind of special 
 12 
obligation toward the local community, which might carry more weight than helping the 
largest number. This indicates whether these companies support a utilitarian or a common-
sense morality way of thinking. The main purpose of the Stakeholder case was to identify 
the groups for which the CSR engaged companies believe they have an obligation. This 
indicates whether these companies support an egoistic, libertarian, utilitarian or a common-
sense morality way of thinking. A feeling of obligation toward none of the groups indicates 
that they support an egoistic way of thinking. A feeling of an impartial negative obligation 
toward everybody indicates that they support a libertarian way of thinking. A feeling of an 
impartial negative and positive obligation toward everybody indicates that they support a 
utilitarian way of thinking. A feeling of special obligations towards certain groups indicates 
that they support a common-sense morality way of thinking. The purpose of the two direct 
questions was to identify the groups that the companies believe they have any obligations 
towards and in what way. This can also indicate whether H1, H2, H3 and H4 are plausible. 
For example, companies that base their CSR policy, concerning positive duties, on common-
sense morality will not feel strongly obligated to help needy strangers, but would rather 
prefer to help locally.   
 
Analysis design   
The analysis of the data contains three steeps. Firstly, by examining the raw data I can 
suggest the normative arguments the companies use. Secondly, using these arguments I can 
suggest the moral principles the companies support. Thirdly, based on these moral 
principles I can suggest which moral theories the companies support. This procedure will be 
more obvious in the following sections, where I first, on the basis of the responses to the 
moral cases and questions mentioned above, suggest which normative arguments the 
companies use, for example, the unique competencies argument. Secondly, based on these 
normative arguments, I suggest which moral principles the companies support, for example, 
the social proximity principle. Thirdly, based on these moral principles, I suggest which 
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moral principles the companies support; i.e., I conclude whether H1, H2, H3 or H4 is 
plausible.       
 
Findings  
I will begin by concentrating on the basic findings from the dilemma, Stakeholder case and 
the two direct questions mentioned above. Then I will focus on the normative arguments, 
followed by the moral principles and finally the moral theories.  
 
Basic findings 
In the Clean Water/Homework dilemma, all the relevant respondents from the three 
companies preferred to help locally rather than to help twice as many people at a distant 
location. Even when I raised the stakes, all of the respondents still preferred to help locally 
(Honoré, 2008; Geday, 2008; Østergård, 2008; Daubjerg, 2008; Meister, 2008, Kjærdgaard, 
2008; K. Hansen, 2008; Rasmussen, 2008; Bosse, 2008). 
In terms of the Stakeholder case, all of the respondents believed that their company among 
others had an obligation towards the local community. This obligation was stronger than the 
obligation, if such an obligation even existed, towards Save the Children and needy children 
in Africa (Honoré, 2008; Hjermov, 2008, T. Hansen, 2008; J. Hansen, 2008; Geday, 2008, L. 
Nielsen, 2008; Jørgensen, 2008; Saxtorph, 2008; Daugbjerg, 2008; Meister, 2008; Østergaard, 
2008; Norman, 2008; K. Hansen, 2008; Kjærdgaard, 2008; Rasmussen, 2008; M. Nielsen, 2008; 
Sandal, 2008; Bosse, 2008). Unlike the Clean Water/Homework dilemma, where all the 
relevant respondents from the three companies agreed at an overall level, the responses to 
the Stakeholder case contained some nuances, both within the three companies (e.g., all the 
respondents from TrygVesta did not name exactly the same group of stakeholders) and 
between the companies (e.g., respondents from Coloplast did not name exactly the same 
group of stakeholders as did respondents from Danfoss). Thus, only some of the 
respondents at TrygVesta believed that the company had some kind of obligation towards 
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Save the Children and needy children in Africa, whereas others at that company did not. 
The responses to the two direct questions concerning obligations towards local and distant 
places and the demarcation of social commitment point in the same direction. The four 
respondents of the three companies answered that the company‟s obligation to the local area 
is stronger than towards far away places, and that the company only had an obligation to its 
operational areas and not to the rest of the world (Honoré, 2008; Østergaard, 2008; K. 
Hansen, 2008; Kjærdgaard, 2008). 
 
Normative arguments 
These basic findings indicate that companies prefer to help people close to them rather than 
a much larger group of people at a distant location. But why do they prefer to do that? This 
question seems to be the basic question the companies need to address. In the following, I 
will examine the five normative arguments evident in the answers to the moral cases and 
questions presented above. I have titled the five lines of argument: the slippery slope 
argument, the shareholder argument, the unique competencies argument, the proximity 
argument and the effectiveness argument. In this regard, it is important to note that the three 
companies do not use the exact same lines of normative arguments. For example, as we shall 
see, Danfoss, which is a family-owned company, does not use „the shareholder argument‟, 
unlike Coloplast and Trygvesta, which are both listed companies. This, however, has no 
implications regarding my conclusion concerning the companies‟ moral foundations, since 
even though the three participating companies do not use precisely the same normative 
arguments, they still support the same kind of moral theory.   
 
The slippery slope argument 
In general, the slippery slope argument has the following structure: if we accept action A, 
which seems morally acceptable, then we either will or ought to accept action N, which 
seems morally unacceptable, and therefore we have to refrain from action A. Philosophers 
 15 
often distinguish between logical and empirical versions of slippery slope arguments 
(Holtug, 1993; Hartogh, 1998). Logical slippery slope arguments imply that if we do A, then 
we ought to do N, since we would be morally inconsistent if we do A without doing N. 
Empirical slippery slope arguments imply that if we do A, then we will do N, because A 
causes us to do N. The point is that even if it is possible to demonstrate a morally relevant 
difference between A and N, then we should still refrain from doing A, because if we do A, 
then we will also do N. Sometimes it can be very difficult, however, to determine whether 
someone uses a logical or empirical version of a slippery slope argument. The reason for this 
might be that most of us believe that if we ought to do N as a consequence of doing A, then 
we will do N, if we do A, and that A only causes us to do N, if we ought to do N, if we do A. 
However, the CSR Manager at Coloplast, Christian Honoré, and the Environment Director at 
Danfoss, Malene Østergård, seem to use a logical version of the slippery slope argument, 
when they say: 
 
“Why build wells? Instead we might donate mosquito nets to prevent malaria. How many 
mosquito nets to prevent malaria could we get for the same amount of money, and how 
many children could be saved? And what about HIV medicine etc.? We say, in order to draw 
a line somewhere, that it has to be within our sphere of interest or within the local 
community” (Honoré, 2008, p. 26). 
 
“(…) the number of problems in the world in principle is endless, and you can never handle 
all of them. So where can you draw the line? (…) It has to be related to our business” 
(Østergård, 2008, p. 127). 
 
Honoré and Østergård apparently use a logical version of the slippery slope argument: if 
Coloplast/Danfoss does A, that is, begins to help people in distant places, then 
Coloplast/Danfoss has taken the first step onto a slippery slope that ends at N,  that is, never 
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ending donations. Never ending donations is morally unacceptable, because it makes the 
company fall apart. The point suggested by the respondents from Coloplast/Danfoss seems 
thus to be that if they begin to do A, then they also ought to do B, C, D and so on, until they 
get to N, because helping some people and not others in distant places would be morally 
inconsistent. Thus, to avoid N, they choose to refrain from doing A, because they are not 
able to draw a line somewhere between A and N. However, they also seem to use an 
empirical version of the slippery slope argument saying: 
 
“We choose to spend our resources here, because otherwise we will not be able to draw the 
line, and we will experience a total meltdown” (Honoré, 2008, p. 44). 
  
“If we are going to support an activity, it has to be a local one. We do not want to engage 
ourselves in far away places, because where does it end? There might be four other places, 
(…) and what about the rest of the country? It would never end” (Østergård, 2008, p. 21). 
 
The point made by Honoré and Østergård seems to be that if Coloplast/Danfoss does A, 
that is, starts helping people in far away places, then Coloplast/Danfoss will get to N, that is, 
a total „meltdown‟; therefore, Coloplast/Danfoss has to refrain from doing A. The reason 
why Coloplast/Danfoss would do N, if they did A, is that the company would not be able to 
draw the line somewhere between A and N. Thus, if the companies start helping people in 
far away places, they have taken the first step down a slippery slope that ends in financial 
ruin. The slippery slope arguments presented here thus seem to function as a kind of 
business rationale, i.e., they have to avoid the slippery slope if they want a consistent CSR 
policy, the logical version, or to stay in business, the empirical version. Notice that the 
logical version also seems to affect the business, because an inconsistent CSR policy seems to 
be a very poor business strategy. So the argument is as follows: if Coloplast/Danfoss does A, 
they will or ought to do N, and they cannot stay in business if they do or ought to do N, 
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therefore they have to refrain from doing A, since staying in business seems desirable. In 
fact, theorists like van de Ven and Jeurissen emphasise that it is not only desirable to stay in 
business, but companies have an obligation to stay in business, since they have an obligation 
toward their employees, suppliers, owners and so on (van de Ven and Jeurissen, 2005). 
 
The shareholder argument 
The shareholder argument relates to the fact that listed companies are owned by their 
shareholders. Both of the listed companies in this study refer to the shareholders when 
arguing why they prefer to help locally and not in distant places. For example, Christian 
Honoré, from Coloplast, and Kim Dyrhauge Hansen, Strategy and Planning Consultant at 
TrygVesta, state: 
 
“It ought not be Sten‟s (CEO at Coloplast) moral views that determine whether we should 
support the victims of the earthquake in Afghanistan or starving people in Africa. That 
would not be right, because it is other people‟s money. That is why such programmes 
should always be based on some kind of business rationale” (Honoré, 2008, p. 48). 
 
“I believe that donating malaria pills to children in Africa, which is praiseworthy, is out of 
our jurisdiction, since we do not have any business in that area, and then we would not be 
able to justify it to our shareholders” (K. Hansen, 2008, p. 50). 
 
The point seems to be that since the company is spending the shareholders‟ money, it should 
only spend it on something approved by the shareholders. Apparently, there are two 
reasons why this is so. First, it could be argued that you would be violating the shareholders‟ 
rights by spending money on something they cannot approve of, e.g., if I gave some of your 
money to some needy children in Africa without your approval, I‟d be violating your rights 
too. Second, as with the slippery slope arguments, the reasoning also seems to be based on 
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some kind of business rationale. It seems obvious that companies operating in opposition to 
their shareholders‟ interests will not stay in business for long.  
 
The unique competencies argument 
The argument regarding unique competencies is usually discussed in the context of 
pharmaceutical companies. It is advocated that such companies have special obligations 
towards a certain group of people (Dunfee, 2006; De George, 2005; Buckley and Ó Tuama, 
2005). The argument can be turned upside down and used to argue why companies do not 
have any obligation to a certain group. The point is that a company with unique 
competencies to combat AIDS in Africa has a special obligation to help people being infected 
there; but if a company has no such competencies, it has no obligation to help. Respondents 
from all three companies in the current study seem to make this point.  For example, Henrik 
Hjermov, VP of the Export Region at Coloplast, Ole Daugbjerg, Chief Reputation Officer at 
Danfoss, and Helle Kjærdgaard, Strategy and Planning Consultant at TrygVesta, argue: 
 
“Are we supposed to save the entire planet? No, probably not. Our core competencies are 
within our line of business. We know something about this, and therefore it makes good 
sense within this area” (Hjermov, 2008, p. 85). 
 
“It depends on how we are going to help. One thing is to help in an area where we have a 
unique competence; another thing is if we just send money, which we could, but then we 
would rather allow a collection among our employees and owners” (Daugbjerg, 2008, p. 93). 
 
“(…) for me it is not a matter of degrees, but that you contribute with want you can, in the 
areas where you have your competencies” (Kjærdgaard, 2008, p. 19). 
 
The proximity argument 
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Some philosophers, such as Kamm, argue that physical proximity matters morally; i.e., the 
physical distance between two agents can influence whether one agent has an obligation to 
help another agent (Kamm, 2000). Other philosophers, such as Nagel, Scheffler, D. Miller 
and R. Miller, argue that social proximity matters morally; i.e., the social relation between 
two agents can influence whether one agent has an obligation to help another agent (Nagel, 
2005; Scheffler, 1997; D. Miller, 2007; R. Miller, 2004). The core of the arguments regarding 
proximity is that our moral intuitions suggest that distance, whether physical or social, 
sometimes matters regarding the obligation of assistance. Most of us feel a stronger 
obligation to help when the needy person is physically or socially close, than when the 
needy person is socially or physically far away. Respondents from all three companies in the 
current study point to some kind of proximity argument, explaining why they prefer to help 
the local community rather than distant strangers. Elisabeth Geday, Head of External 
Relations at Coloplast, Ole Daugbjerg from Danfoss, and Troels Rasmussen, Head of 
Communication at TrygVesta, state: 
 
“(…) it stems from the proximity principle, and because it lies within our stakeholder cycle, 
that our obligation increases the closer something is to our factory” (Geday, 2008, p. 148). 
 
“If you locate a factory or a company somewhere, you are part of that community, (…) and 
then you have an obligation” (Daugbjerg, 2008, p. 92). 
 
“We are located in Ballerup Municipality, and therefore we have a special obligation 
towards Ballerup Municipality” (Rasmussen, 2008, p. 105-106). 
 
Whether the respondents quoted above believe it is the physical proximity or a combination 
of the physical and the social proximity, or maybe even just the social proximity, that 
matters is difficult to say. All of the respondents seem to argue that physical distance matters 
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morally. However, it might just be the social proximity, or a combination of both the 
physical proximity and the social proximity, since the physical location might create a social 
relation, which matters morally.  
 
The effectiveness argument 
Supporters of the effectiveness argument claim that even though on the surface it may 
appear more effective to help people in Africa than to help people in Denmark, it is the other 
way around. It will do more good to help locally, even though it appears you might be able 
to help a much larger group in a remote area. In the current study, one of the respondents 
refers to the effectiveness argument. Stine Bosse, CEO at TrygVesta, suggests: 
 
“What we do in our own society, like for example better integration and solving our 
problems concerning ethnicity and all that, and this might be a bit abstract, in the long run 
will help some children in Africa. Globalisation demands that Denmark be able to solve this, 
(…) that the many different people living here are able to live in peace with one another, and 
that will not just have a positive impact on the Danish society, but also on our ability to do 
something in Africa, India and Pakistan” (Bosse, 2008, p. 165). 
 
It is important to note that Bosse‟s point is not that it does not help at all to aid people in 
distant places, as suggested by Schmidtz (Schmidtz, 2000). Bosse just argues that more good 
is done directing our resources to projects locally, than assisting in distant locations. 
 
Discussion of findings 
The findings from the Clean Water/Homework dilemma indicate that none of the CSR 
policies of these three companies regarding positive duties are based on utilitarian moral 
theory. A utilitarian, other things being equal, would choose to help the largest number of 
people, since this would maximise happiness, seen from an impartial point of view. This 
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would indicate that H3 is plausible. 
The findings from the Stakeholder case also seem to indicate that none of the CSR policies of 
the three companies regarding doing good are built on utilitarian moral theory. A utilitarian 
never differentiates between groups, but argues that the company has an equal obligation 
toward all human beings. Hypothetically, there may be instrumental reasons as to why 
companies should favour certain groups in order to maximise happiness. However, 
according to a utilitarian perspective, and all other things being equal, a company does not 
have any special obligations towards any groups, but should choose the action that 
maximises happiness. This would indicate that H3 is plausible. The case also indicates that 
H1 and H2 are plausible, because all of the respondents from the three companies believed 
that their company had a positive obligation towards the local community. This indicates 
that none of the CSR policies of these three companies regarding positive duties are built on 
ethical egoism or libertarian moral theories. An ethical egoist believes that he has no moral 
obligations towards the local community, since he is only under a moral obligation to do 
what is in his best interest. However, there might be instrumental reasons for an ethical 
egoist to help others and, for example, to support the local community, but the ethical egoist 
will feel no moral obligation to do so, unless it is in his best interest. However, in relation to 
the Stakeholder case, none of the respondents stated that they believed their company only 
had an obligation towards certain groups because it was in the company‟s own best interest. 
A libertarian also does not believe that he has any positive duties toward the local 
community, since he believes that he is only obligated not to violate anyone‟s negative 
rights. The respondents‟ answers indicate, however, that they were not just thinking about 
refraining from doing harm, when responding to the Stakeholder case, since they probably 
would not have differentiated among the groups, because they would believe that their 
company has an obligation not to harm anyone. This impression was also confirmed by 
other parts of my investigation, for example, regarding the companies‟ policies concerning 
negative rights. So, it seems likely that the respondents were also thinking about positive 
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duties when they, in connection to the Stakeholder case, were talking about an obligation 
towards the local community.  If this is correct, then H1 and H2 seem plausible. 
The responses to the two direct questions also indicate that none of the three companies‟ 
CSR policies regarding positive duties are based on utilitarian moral theory, because 
utilitarianism contains an impartial view about who one ought to help. A utilitarian would 
not believe that a company does not have an obligation towards people in distant places or 
that a company‟s social obligations are stronger in the local area than in distant locations. 
This indicates that H3 is plausible. The respondents‟ recognition of their companies‟ social 
obligations towards the local area indicates that that none of the three companies‟ CSR 
policies regarding positive duties are based on ethical egoism or libertarian moral theory, 
because ethical egoists and libertarians do not believe that companies have any social 
obligation towards their local community. This indicates that H1 and H2 are plausible.  
But what about H4? Is it plausible that CSR policies of companies engaged in CSR are based 
on some kind of common-sense morality? According to the above preliminary findings and 
arguments, I argue that companies engaged in CSR base their CSR policies on three 
common-sense moral principles. The principles, which all refer to special obligations 
towards certain groups, are: a principle regarding fiduciary duties towards shareholders, a 
physical proximity principle and a social proximity principle. 
Confirmation of these three moral principles suggests that we would be able to confirm H4. 
This also means that we will be able to confirm H1, H2 and H3, since supporters of ethical 
egoism, libertarianism and utilitarianism reject special obligations. In that regard it is 
important to note that we are only talking about morally-based special obligations and not 
legally-based special obligations. Supporters of ethical egoism, libertarianism and 
utilitarianism only reject morally-based special obligations, but not necessarily legally-based 
special obligations, for example, legal obligations toward employees, customers, 
shareholders etc. Ethical egoists, libertarians and utilitarians are also not rejecting 
preferential treatment, if it is given for instrumental reasons. As Singer points out, 
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utilitarians may believe, for example, that it would maximise happiness, from an impartial 
point of view, if parents were partial towards their own children (Singer, 2004). However, if I 
can show that the above normative arguments support the three principles, then H1, H2, H3 
and H4 would be confirmed. 
In that regard, it is important to note that the first principle, concerning fiduciary duties 
towards shareholders, is based only on the normative arguments given by the respondents 
from Coloplast and TrygVesta. It is also important to keep in mind that since this article only 
presents the CSR policies of companies regarding positive duties, i.e., actively doing good, 
these moral principles are not the only ones that may arise from the complete CSR policies of 
the three companies. 
 
Fiduciary duties towards shareholders 
Theorists such as Boatright and Marcoux advocate that managers have fiduciary duties 
towards their shareholders (Boatright, 2002; Marcoux, 2003). The point is that managers have 
fiduciary duties towards shareholders, just as doctors have fiduciary duties towards their 
patients or adult children may have fiduciary duties towards their senile parents. 
Shareholders give managers authority to handle their business in accordance with their best 
interests, just as senile parents hand over to their adult children the authority to handle their 
estates in accordance with their best interests. 
Looking at the arguments given by the respondents from Coloplast and TrygVesta in „the 
shareholder argument‟ mentioned above, it seems reasonable to deduce some kind of 
fiduciary principle. The respondents argue that management cannot do just as they please, 
since they have an obligation towards the shareholders. This obligation seems to be very 
similar to the fiduciary duties adult children have toward their senile parents, who have 
entrusted them with their estates. In such cases, the children have a duty to act in the best 
interest of their parents, and, for example, donating the family fortune to a charity 
organisation against their parents‟ wishes would therefore seem wrong. This seems to be the 
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same line of argument presented by the respondents from Coloplast and TrygVesta 
regarding their shareholders. They argue that their companies should only spend money if it 
is in the best financial interest of the shareholders or in accordance with their moral values. 
In that regard, it is important to note that acting in accordance with the interest of the 
shareholders does not mean that one should always try to maximise profit. The shareholders 
may not be interested only in revenue, but also in other aspects, for example CSR. If a 
company donates the construction of a well to the local community, it may live up to its 
fiduciary duties towards its shareholders by either getting return on its investment, for 
example by strengthening its brand, or by acting in accordance with the moral values of the 
shareholders, for example by living in accordance with special obligations towards the local 
community. 
 
The physical proximity principle 
Supporters of the physical proximity principle believe that physical distance matters morally 
(Kamm, 2000). Typically, they believe that you have a strong obligation to help a needy 
stranger standing in front of you, but that your obligation to help a needy stranger far away 
from you, if you actually have one, is much weaker. The responses to the moral cases 
regarding stakeholders and Clean Water/Homework and to the two direct questions clearly 
indicate that all three companies support a kind of physical proximity principle. However, 
even though they prefer to help people physically close rather than distant strangers, we still 
need to know whether the companies believe that physical distance matters morally. The 
physical distance may not be the decisive factor in that regard. Other factors like social 
proximity may influence the companies‟ decisions.  
However, my data indicate that the three companies support some kind of physical 
proximity principle, since the respondents refer to the physical location of their company, as 
noted in relation to the proximity argument. In that regard, the respondents emphasise that 
the physical location of their companies is important in relation to their positive duties. Even 
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though this indicates that the respondents believe physical distance matters morally, we can 
not be sure that this is actually the case. For example, it might be the social bonds created on 
the basis of physical proximity that matter morally.   
Additionally, it is hard to say how much the respondents believe distance matters, i.e., to 
what degree the positive obligations decrease when the physical distance increases. Even 
though the responses concerning the Clean Water/Homework dilemma indicate that 
distance matters morally (i.e., the respondents prefer to help locally rather than far away, 
even though they would have been able to help a much larger group using the same amount 
of resources), we can not be certain how much moral weight physical proximity is given, 
because other factors may also play a role. Nonetheless, even though we are not able to 
determine precisely the moral status of physical proximity, the data clearly indicate that all 
three companies support some kind of physical proximity principle. 
 
The social proximity principle 
Supporters of the social proximity principle evaluate our moral obligation towards people 
on the basis of the relation we have with them, i.e., the relation is an important factor 
regarding obligation between agents (Nagel, 2005; Scheffler, 1997; D. Miller, 2007; R. Miller, 
2004). For example, most states distinguish between their own citizens and foreigners. If a 
Danish tourist is kidnapped during a summer holiday in India, the Danish Government is 
much more willing to help, than if the tourist is not Danish. This seems to be in accordance 
with common-sense morality, since most of us accept that states have special obligations 
towards their own citizens. Another example of social proximity is the relation between 
family and friends. Many of us believe, intuitively, that we have special obligations towards 
family and friends, meaning that our positive duties towards them are stronger than 
towards strangers; i.e., if I must choose between rescuing my own child or a stranger‟s child 
from a burning building, then I ought to rescue my own. 
Similarly, respondents from the three companies seem to believe that they have a stronger 
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moral obligation towards those they are related to than towards those to whom they are not 
related, at least when it comes to positive duties. The responses given in relation to the Clean 
Water/Homework dilemma, the two direct questions and the normative argument 
mentioned regarding proximity all indicate that these companies believe that social 
proximity matters morally, since they feel more obligated to help those they are related to, 
than those to whom they are not related. In this regard, it is important to note that social 
proximity, in the current paper, refers both to relations based on contractual relations, such 
as relations with suppliers, and social relations, such as relations with the local community.   
However, it may not be social proximity that matters, but physical proximity.  To determine 
whether the companies actually support some kind of social proximity principle, we have to 
turn to the responses given in the Stakeholder case and the normative arguments mentioned 
regarding unique competencies. In the Stakeholder case, it cannot be physical proximity 
alone that matters, since suppliers and customers, for whom all of the companies believe 
they have a strong obligation, are not necessarily physically close. Here, it seems to be the 
social proximity that denotes the companies‟ obligations toward these groups. The same is 
true regarding unique competencies; respondents argue that companies with unique 
competencies have a special obligation toward certain groups. Again, it seems to be the 
relation between the company and a certain group that denotes the obligation, i.e., social 
proximity matters morally. It is hard to say to what degree the companies believe that social 
proximity matters. But even though we are not able to determine precisely the moral status 
of social proximity, we can confirm that the three companies support some kind of social 
proximity principle. 
 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the above, we can now confirm H4. The CSR policies of companies engaged 
in CSR, regarding positive duties, are based on common-sense morality principles regarding 
special obligations. This also means that we can confirm H1, H2 and H3, since principles 
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regarding special obligations are in conflict with moral egoism, libertarianism and 
utilitarianism. 
I am aware that some of the normative arguments presented above seem to pull in another 
direction. The effectiveness argument, presented by Bosse, the CEO at TrygVesta, seems to 
be more in accordance with utilitarianism than with common-sense principles concerning 
special obligations. Bosse‟s point is that we will do more good, i.e., maximise happiness, 
directing our resources toward our local problems rather than towards global problems. 
Some interpretations of the slippery slope arguments given by respondents from Coloplast 
and Danfoss are also more in accordance with utilitarianism than with common-sense 
principles concerning special obligations. We could interpret the respondents‟ arguments to 
be versions of the effectiveness argument; i.e., Coloplast/Danfoss actually maximises 
happiness if they help locally rather than far away. By helping in distant places, they 
eventually will experience a total meltdown, and will not be able to help anyone. Doing that, 
the slippery slope arguments seem to be based on utilitarian moral theory rather than 
common-sense principles regarding special obligation. 
However, even though these normative arguments on the surface do not seem to confirm 
H4, the data nevertheless suggest that H4 is confirmed, primarily because the normative 
arguments just mentioned do not conflict with H4. The respondents may believe it is more 
effective to help locally than globally, and simultaneously believe that companies have 
special obligations toward certain closely related groups. In that regard, it is important to 
note that the respondents presenting the slippery slope or the effectiveness argument in 
relation to the Stakeholder case and the rest of the questions, like the other respondents, 
responded in a way that actually confirms H4. H1, H2, H3 and H4 are thus confirmed. This 
indicates that companies engaged in CSR do not base their CSR policies on goal-orientated 
teleological moral theories, such as ethical egoism or utilitarianism, but rather on duty based 
common-sense morality. This also indicates that the moral foundations of the official ethical 
guidelines of companies do not seem to mirror the moral foundations of managers. As 
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mentioned earlier, prominent investigations regarding the ethical behaviour of managers 
conclude that managers mainly act in accordance with a goal-orientated teleological moral 
theory, namely utilitarianism, which is in conflict with deontologically-orientated theories 
like common-sense morality (Fritzche and Becker, 1984; Premeaux and Mony, 1993; 
Premeaux, 2004).      
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